Macalester International
Volume 25 The Macalester/Maastricht Essays

Article 10

Spring 2010

The Political Ecology of Water: Globalization and
Transboundary Water Management
Elizabeth A. Larson
Macalester College

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl
Recommended Citation
Larson, Elizabeth A. (2010) "The Political Ecology of Water: Globalization and Transboundary Water Management," Macalester
International: Vol. 25, Article 10.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol25/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

The Political Ecology of Water:
Globalization and Transboundary Water Management
Elizabeth A. Larson
I. Introduction
I had been thinking about how to begin this yearlong research project when I asked one
of my 17-year-old students in Khayelitsha, a township outside of Cape Town, “How do
you think pollution can harm people?” He described how the family that lives in the
shack next to him pours their wash water into the alleyway and it runs down the hill,
picking up more debris and joining with other families‟ wastewater. He added that this
pollution could get into the groundwater and affect the water that everyone drinks. It was
there that this research paper began to take shape.
My student‟s example of wastewater running down the hill from shack to shack is an
illustration of how the actions of one person towards their environment can affect others
in unforeseen ways. People are beginning to realize their effect on the environment that
we all share, and through globalization even states are seeing how their decisions
concerning environmental management are affecting other sovereign states. As the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) wrote in Our Common Future:
“the physical effects of our decisions spill across national frontiers.”i Globalization has
changed the way in which people relate to the environment, in particular the way in
which people relate to water. Different forms of globalization have produced conflicting
discourses surrounding the issue of water, which in turn have affected the way that
transboundary watercourses are managed.
The phenomenon that I address in this study is globalization‟s effect on water
discourses and the management of transboundary watercourses. The discourses that
surround water are influenced mainly by three facets of globalization: economic
globalization, the rise of supra-national and international institutions, and global civil
society. Transboundary watercourses precede the global era, yet globalization has had a
fundamental impact on how they are managed and governed: “Institutions are getting
better and more resilient, management and understanding are improving, and these issues
are increasingly on the radar of global and local decision makers.”ii In addition to
institutional strength, and perhaps aiding it, is the proliferation of technology.
Technological innovations have made transboundary watercourses easier to map, model,
and manage on a higher level than in the pre-global era.iii Globalization has also
expanded the worldview of actors that manage watercourses. Consequently, there has
been an increased tendency to derive international solutions for local and regional
problems concerning water.iv As was well stated by Joost Fontein, “water can no longer
be understood simply as a „natural resource‟ subject to contradictory and contested efforts
to be managed, controlled, provisioned, contained, or conserved. The political materiality
of water can indeed be a lens through which to fathom the depth of the „complex
reciprocity‟ of human-environment relations.”v
This study is driven by two research questions. First, how have the processes of
globalization impacted transboundary watercourse management? And second, who are

the actors in this management and how do they apply different discourses surrounding
water that have come out of the global era? In order to answer these questions, I
investigate not only the theoretical side of water management, but also the practical
implications of the uniquely global discourses. First, I conduct a literature review in
which I discuss the three aspects of globalization mentioned earlier and how they have
shaped discourse around water. Next, two case studies illustrate the effects of these
discourses on water management in the era of globalization. The two transboundary
watercourses that I will discuss are the Orange River in southern Africa and the Meuse
River in northwestern Europe. The Orange River case study is focused on the Lesotho
Highlands Water Project (LHWP) and the involvement of the World Bank and
transnational corporations in the project. The Meuse River case study focuses on the
relationship between the Netherlands and the provinces of Flanders and Wallonia in
Belgium in the management of the watercourse and pollution. Finally, I conclude by
summarizing my findings and the lessons to be learned from the shift in water discourses
and management that has been caused by globalization.
II. Literature Review
Water in the global era has acquired more meanings than simply a natural resource. The
key to water management not only revolves around the need to deal with the scarcity of
the resource, but also the complex interactions of the different aspects of water‟s cultural,
social, political, and ecological significance.vi Water has taken on a new significance in
light of three aspects of globalization: economic globalization, the rise of supra-national
governmental institutions, and global civil society. These have impacted the discoursesvii
surrounding water by introducing different bodies of experts from which knowledge
about water has flowed. According to Foucault, “discourse entails a power/knowledge
dynamic, within which there are literally some things that cannot be thought, said, or
done.”viii It is the language that these forms of globalization use to describe water that
becomes significant in their impact upon methods of governance in addition to the
language that the governing bodies in turn use to describe themselves. In this section, I
show how each form of globalization produced a different discourse surrounding water.
Economic globalization and the hegemonic ideas of neo-liberalismix have produced the
discourse of water as an economic good. The 1992 Dublin Conference on Water and
Environment laid down the definition of water as an economic good for the first time.
Principle Four of the statement that was produced by the conference states: “water has an
economic value, and should be recognized as an economic good, while also maintaining
that access to clean water and sanitation at affordable prices are fundamental human
rights.”x States and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, have
chosen to focus mostly on the economic value aspect of this definition, as even the
portion about human rights maintains that it is primarily an economic item. This
definition has led to a discourse of privatization in which the private sector is believed to
be the most efficient venue to deliver water services to the public.xi Privatization “is a
nebulous term, although unambiguous in political origin and coincides with the rise of
neoliberalism…for the proponents of privatization it is the very incarnation of the liberal
project.”xii In this way, privatization of water and its definition as an economic good is a
result of the global neo-liberal project.

One of the central assumptions that paved the way for this definition is that
governments, particularly in the Global South, are unable to deliver the necessary water
infrastructure due to inefficiency and corruption. Therefore, international financial
institutions and regional development banks have shifted their focus to encouraging
governments to manage water resources through the private sector because it is believed
to be more efficient and therefore more sustainable.xiii Privatization uses the language of
sustainability to construct “a subjective reality. And, indeed, privitisation produces
particular forms of disciplinary conduct or, as Foucault…conceptualised it,
„governmentality.‟”xiv The practical application of this discursive strategy comes in
foreign direct investment (FDI) by transnational corporations (TNCs) in the water sector.
Though neoclassical economic arguments assert that water is allocated more efficiently
through the private sector,xv there is a contrary theory known as the “global reach
argument.” This logic is based on the idea that FDI is a part of the strategy of globalizing
firms as opposed to a simple resource flow. TNCs become global institutions that actively
produce imperfect markets in order to increase profits. Instead of increasing efficiency in
water delivery and infrastructure, they “reduce it by making markets less perfect as a
result of their own need to control, reduce, or eliminate competition and maximise
surplus profits.”xvi Thus, the constructed reality of efficiency that is conveyed in the
discourse of privatization could be seen to as a means to the neo-liberal goal of profit
maximization. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has yet to rule on issues of water
privatization, specifically bulk water exports. However, it has traditionally upheld
economic interests over environmental and human rights concerns.xvii The WTO
disallows obstacles to the trade of commodities. If water continues to be defined as a
commodity, it is entirely possible that the WTO will not be able to stop the sale of
water.xviii Economic globalization in the form of neo-liberalism has produced a discourse
of privatization and commodification of water, which has affected the governmentality of
water management.
The rise of supra-national and international institutions as a part of, and reaction to,
globalization has affected discourses about water in a different way than economic
globalization. This essay focuses on the effect of the European Union (EU) and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) on the governance of water and
discourses surrounding water and water management. These institutions have encouraged
integrative management strategies and cooperation between states in the management of
shared water resources, as well as facilitating the development of the discourse of water
as a human right. There is no question that, “the problem of water supply…will become
more political in the twenty-first century…[I]n an urbanised planet, with nearly eight
billion inhabitants by the year 2020, water will be as strategically vital for living as
petroleum.”xix The international political nature of water necessitates governance and
political bargaining at the supra-national level. In order to analyze the effects of supranational governance on international watercourses, I use the framework of “ecogovernmentality,” a subset of political ecology. Eco-governmentality is a method of
analysis used to investigate how the state and experts construct discourses surrounding
“the environment,” and how these discourses are used to bring territory or resources
under state control and regulate human activity within that sphere of control. In order to
conduct this investigation, I review a few of the key documents about water governance
and human rights produced by the EU and SADC.

“Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October
2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy,” or
the Water Framework Directive (WFD), is an EU-level policy document that initiated an
EU-wide approach to water management, emphasizing cooperation. This document
concerns the protection of all waters, with objectives to be reached by 2015.xx The WFD
interacts with other EU instruments as well as local multilateral agreements concerning
watercourses. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has the
most comprehensive cooperative environmental framework, with six regional
environmental conventions and related protocols concerning transboundary watercourses.
Approximately one hundred bilateral or multilateral agreements and supranational laws
support these conventions and protocols.xxi However, for the sake of clarity and brevity,
this study focuses on the WFD and its interactions with the Meuse River agreements in
the Meuse case study. The WFD requires that surface water, such as rivers, be managed
with a River Basin Management Plan, which characterizes rivers according to their
hydro-morphological characteristics. The member states are expected to integrate WFD
requirements into existing EU agreements and work toward “good status” with regard to
water quality.xxii The WFD has been influenced by some of the conventions that it
interacts with vertically, the most significant of which is the Convention on
Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes. According to Andrew Farmer, “This
Convention has introduced issues such as ecological status and integrated river-basin
management, which are central to the Directive.”xxiii The WFD is the EU‟s legal response
to the Convention. It is much broader in scope and is monitored by the European
Commission and enforceable in the European Court of Justice.xxiv
Though much younger than the EU, SADC, the regional governance body in southern
Africa, also has a regional water governance scheme. The “Revised Protocol on Shared
Water Courses in the Southern African Development Community” was signed by the
SADC member states in 2000, although with a much different approach than the WFD.
The Protocol‟s stated objective is to “foster closer cooperation for judicious, sustainable
and coordinated management, protection and utilization of shared watercourses and
advance the SADC agenda of regional integration and poverty alleviation.”xxv This
objective is much more anthropocentric than the aim of the WFD, which is to maintain
and improve the aquatic environment of the European Community.xxvi The difference in
aims is explained by Anthony Turton‟s approach to interpreting transboundary water
management in SADC. Turton asserts that, “The traditional paradigm is based on national
sovereignty as a „given,‟ with an inherent fear in some developing countries that close
cooperation in the management of a shared resource might inadvertently lead to an
erosion of sovereign control of that resource.”xxvii SADC recognizes the need for
supranational governance of watercourses, however its members‟ status as developing
countries has led it to enact a Protocol with little to no enforcement mechanisms. Article
7 of the Protocol concerns the settlement of disputes. While the WFD assigns
enforcement to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, SADC
lacks these strong institutions, delegating dispute settlement to the parties involved.xxviii
The discourse of strong regional governance is not as prevalent in southern Africa as it is
in Europe, which may be a factor in the different approaches to transboundary water
management illustrated in the case studies below.
The third aspect of globalization that has significantly influenced the way in which

transboundary watercourses are managed is global civil society. This essay discusses the
international environmental movement and its affect on discourses surrounding the
inherent value of nature. The environmental movement and the discourse of nature‟s
intrinsic value can arguably be traced back to Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, the book
that has been credited with launching the contemporary environmental movement. An
aquatic biologist, Carson wrote the book through the latter half of the 1950s and
published it in 1962. The language used in the classic is nature-centric, and exposes the
ills to nature that are caused by human action. In the second chapter Carson accuses the
human race of assaulting nature:
The most alarming of all man‟s assaults upon the environment is the
contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and even lethal
materials. This pollution is for the most part irrecoverable; the chain of
evil it initiates not only in the world that must support life but in living
tissues is for the most part irreversible. In this now universal
contamination of the environment, chemicals are the sinister and littlerecognized partners of radiation in changing the very nature of the world –
the very nature of its life.xxix
Carson‟s words set off a global movement and debate that would spawn strong nongovernmental organizations such as Greenpeace, and begin the discourse of the inherent
value of nature.
This perspective has also shaped the way in which people and governments view
nature. Nature is seen within the environmentalist discourse as a holistic entity in itself,
with inherent value, rather than as a natural resource that can be contained by the
boundaries of a sovereign nation. Over a quarter of a century ago, Norman and Dorothy
Myers wrote about the rhetoric of the Stockholm Conference in 1972 that described how
the world has become One Earth with a “seamless web of life.”xxx Their article and the
classic environmentalist governance discourse advocates for a body of international
environmental law to address the urgent need for an “accepted way of doing things” in
order to control transboundary pollution and preserve nature.xxxi The international
environmental movement of the 1960s, „70s, and „80s introduced the ideas of pollution
control as an international effort for the good of the planet – not just human beings. The
effect of this movement on governance is now being seen 20 years later in measures such
as the WFD, as governments reflect the will of people‟s global environmental
consciousness.
Economic globalization, the rise of supranational institutions, and the rise of global
civil society all have clear and interrelated effects on discourses surrounding water
management. Economic globalization produced a discourse of water as an economic
good; the rise of supranational institutions produced a discourse of cooperative,
integrated management; and global civil society produced a discourse of pollution control
and water as an essential part of nature with intrinsic value. The following case studies of
the Orange and Meuse Rivers serve as illustrations of the different ways in which these
discourses have been applied in the developing world and the developed world.

III. Case Studies
The study of the roles played by the World Bank and TNCs in both the Lesotho and
South African sides of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) shows the way in
which their involvement has influenced the discourse surrounding the governance of the
project. First, I look at the way in which the World Bank‟s involvement in the
construction of the dams in Lesotho has shaped the description of, and actions in, the
project. Then I look at the South African side and how transnational corporations
controlling the water sector have used the language and technology of sustainable
development to shape a neo-liberal concept of citizenship through water infrastructure.
Through presenting both sides of the boundary, I show how the global vocabulary of
sustainable development has been co-opted to justify neo-liberal methods of water
governance.
A. The Orange River
The Orange River originates in Lesotho and runs through South Africa, creating a border
with Namibia before finally emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. The Lesotho Highlands
Water Project is a product of a deal brokered between the apartheid government of South
Africa and a military government in Lesotho in 1986. It was conceived as a plan to export
water on an unprecedented scale from Lesotho to South Africa‟s industrial heartland of
Johannesburg and Pretoria. It was effected by storing the water in the Orange River and
channeling it northward through a 115 km-long tunnel. A secondary aim was to provide
Lesotho with a source of hydroelectricity.xxxii The project began with the construction of
the Katse Dam (Phase 1A), completed in 1997 with the aid of international organizations,
including the World Bank. The second phase of the project (Phase 1B) was appraised by
the World Bank in 1996, after the first phase was finished. The LHWP is seen as an
important development project by the government of South Africa that will bring badly
needed resources to the water-poor Gaunteng province. President Mandela described
South Africa‟s post-apartheid position on the project: “We in South Africa need the water
from the LHWP to meet the increase in our demand, and, in particular, to meet the needs
of previously neglected communities.”xxxiii It is exhibited as a project that will benefit the
poor of South Africa and Lesotho through the help of the World Bank and Transnational
Corporations that promote the sustainable use of the Orange River basin while
stimulating development.
The discourse used to describe the project and its outcomes has shaped the way that
people view and act toward it. The actors involved in the LHWP have shaped the
discourse to reflect the global environmental ideal of sustainable development, an ideal
that can be contradictory to (but is not necessarily in opposition to) neoliberalism. These
actors include the World Bank on the supply-side and Transnational Corporations, which
manage the demand-side of the project. They have used this discourse to describe the
way in which the infrastructure introduced as a result of the project will impact people‟s
lives. Neoliberal discourses and motives are hidden behind the sustainable development
rhetoric. This is inevitable given the current global economic situation and the common
definition of water as an economic good.xxxiv The World Bank and TNCs use sustainable
development discourse in the case of the LHWP to strike a balance between growth and

global distributive justice,xxxv and thus to appeal to all interest groups involved in the
Lesotho and South African sides of the project.
The World Bank‟s involvement in the LHWP has been extensive from the beginning.
The Bank took the role of “central organiser of technical, financial, social and ecological
information about the LHWP, and will continue in this vein in the future.”xxxvi Although
the original loan was given to Lesotho, it was only the nominal borrower. South Africa
was actually responsible for repaying the debt and servicing the loans, though at the time
of the original loan, they were the subject of economic sanctions and therefore not
technically allowed to be a recipient of loans.xxxvii Due to the political climate at the time,
it appears that the project was originally “in-part a sanctions-busting, prestige project
with…geo-political overtones,”xxxviii which necessitated the involvement of the World
Bank at a high level of governance of the project and therefore of the transboundary
watercourse that resulted. The Bank and its Inspection Panel moved into a role of
“bureaucratic rationality” that is traditionally associated with the nation-state.xxxix The
fact that the World Bank had taken on this role makes the language they used of primary
importance for the outcome and impacts of the project. A closer inspection of the actions
of the World Bank and its subsidiaries shows that the sustainable development discourse
was driven by economic concerns and was working in concert with a neo-liberal agenda
rooted in an understanding of water as a commodity.
The aim of the LHWP is to divert about 40 percent of the water in the Senqu River
basin into South Africa‟s Vaal River system in Gauteng province, where the water would
then go to the area around Johannesburg.xl This is to be achieved by a system of five
dams and a tunnel to the Vaal, altering the natural course of the Orange/Senqu River. The
LHWP adopted the Bank‟s “Operational Directive on Environmental Impacts,” which
requires a thorough investigation of possible environmental consequences, including
human health and safety.xli However, no impact assessment was done for Phase 1A.
Under pressure following the devastating environmental and social impacts of Phase 1A,
an Environmental Impact Assessment was mandated for all aspects of Phase 1B as well
as the entire project. Despite the acknowledgement of transboundary impacts by the
Environmental Impact Assessment team, no Transboundary Impact Assessment was
carried out. The reason for this oversight was that “[The World Bank] feared that
assessing these impacts would severely delay implementation of Phase 1B.”xlii Had they
conducted the assessment, they would have found that a fully implemented LHWP would
give the Lower Orange River an irregular flow, disrupting the livelihoods of those living
in the other riparian nations.xliii This dramatic change in the river system is unsustainable
in the long run, as many ecosystems and communities downstream depend on the river.
Disrupting the flow of the Orange River can be ecologically disastrous at every level, as
dry land biota are also specifically adapted to the natural flow cycles of the river and
depend on the regular delivery of water.xliv Socially, the project will also have large
impacts, as large-scale water projects are more likely to negatively affect communities
living downstream than those living in the project area.xlv Downstream communities, if
adequately informed of the impact of the project, could have demanded compensation for
their losses. However, this concession would have lessened the economic benefits of the
project to South Africa, making the project a more expensive option.xlvi A “sustainable
development” project would have had to meet the standards of impact assessment that the

World Bank itself has mandated. In this case, it failed to do so, which brings into
question the sustainability of the project.
Another example of the lack of action on the part of the World Bank is the fact that it
did not conduct an adequate assessment of demand-side management options before
funding the new supply-side infrastructure. Recent data shows that the project was not
necessary at the time that it was implemented. The South African Department of Water
Affairs admitted that no new supply of water is needed in Gauteng until 2025.xlvii In
addition, the planners at Rand Water, the water supplier in Gauteng, suggested that the
project could have been delayed 17–20 years if effective demand-side management
(DSM) projects had been implemented.xlviii In response to this evidence, the World Bank
argued that postponing the Mohale Dam would increase construction costs.xlix In
choosing to invest in infrastructure that will cause ecological and social harm without
investigating whether or not the project is actually needed, the World Bank has
contradicted its sustainable development rhetoric, bringing to light the neoliberal drivers
that lie beneath the discourse of sustainability.
On the South African side, management of the water that has been transferred from the
Orange River to the Vaal is delegated to private companies that are supported by
transnational corporations. The failure of the state to provide adequate infrastructure has
led the World Bank to strongly encourage the use of the private sector to allocate
resources.l The two main corporations that use LHWP water are Rand Water and
Johannesburg Water. For the purpose of this essay, I focus on Johannesburg Water and its
operations in Soweto, one of the townships of Johannesburg that supposedly benefits
from the LHWP.li Specifically, I look at the use of prepaid meters and water tariffs under
the discourse of sustainability as a means of demand-side water governance.
Johannesburg Water (Pty), Ltd. was created as an independent company, with the city
of Johannesburg as the sole shareholder. The transnational corporation Suez Water was
awarded the management contract with the idea that corporatization of the water sector
would increase efficiency and Suez Water would introduce sanctioned business practices
into water management and provision. Part of this process was strict enforcement of fullcost recovery beyond the 6,000 liters per month of free water mandated by the South
African Constitution. This enforcement led to water shutoffs in Soweto, one of
Johannesburg‟s poorest townships.lii The World Bank insists that supplying clean water
to the poor can be done through the private sector, but evidence suggests that enforcing
full-cost recovery allows the rich to use as much water as they like while the poor
continue to suffer from lack of access.liii Johannesburg Water uses pre-paid meters to
enforce full-cost recovery, and the discourse that it uses to justify this use of meters is
sustainability. It began a campaign of public awareness to educate citizens on how to stay
within the 6,000 liters a month through water conservation measures, emphasizing that
having to pay for the extra water would be the result of wasteful use.liv This process
conflated the issues of full-cost recovery and sustainability.
The LHWP caused an increase in the price of water because part of the financing plan
was to have the end-users pay the increased cost. The end-user, Rand Water and
Johannesburg Water, passed this cost on to the consumer through price increases. As
prices rose, the ability of municipalities to collect payments from low-income residents,
such as those in Soweto, fell.lv The use of pre-paid meters not only implemented full-cost
recovery under the discourse of sustainability, but it changed the residents‟ relationship

with the state and water accessibility. During the apartheid era, nonpayment for services
was one of the only means by which township residents could protest the state. Having to
pay for water before use eliminated this channel of protest, therefore changing their
relationship with the state and limiting expressions of agency. Von Schnitzler argues,
“neoliberal reforms are seen to hinge on the construction of new forms of agency and,
indeed, to work through the promotion of new conceptions and practices of
citizenship.”lvi The introduction of pre-paid meters under the vocabulary of sustainability,
and the implementation of full-cost recovery through privatization, turned water into a
measureable commodity and transformed the residents‟ relationship with the state. The
meters force residents to calculate how much water they are using and attach a monetary
value, turning water into an exchangeable commodity. Their agency and relationship to
the state is expressed through their ability to manage and purchase water as such.lvii The
language of sustainability that Johannesburg Water uses to justify the pre-paid meters
does not fully encompass the impact that it has had on the concept of water and
citizenship in Soweto. It appears to be a thin veil over the economic considerations that
drive the use of pre-paid meters to achieve full-cost recovery.
The discourse of sustainable development that has been used by the World Bank and
Johannesburg Water to describe and justify their actions is not consistent with their
actions on the ground. The World Bank violated its own standards for Environmental
Impact Assessments when it did not assess the transboundary impacts of the project or
look at alternative demand-side management options. The fact that these two crucial
sustainability assessments were not done (in favor of starting the project quickly in order
to avoid increased construction costs) exposes the neoliberal economic agenda of the
project.
On the South African side, the introduction of pre-paid meters by Johannesburg Water
under the discourse of water conservation and sustainability can also be seen as co-opting
sustainable development discourse. Upon closer inspection, it is clear that the practice of
paying for water before use changes the users‟ relationship with the state into an
economic relationship. Pre-pay meters are a measure to implement full-cost recovery
hidden behind sustainability rhetoric. The supply and demand sides of the project have
co-opted sustainable development discourse to obscure neoliberal aims.
B. The Meuse River
In this case study, I investigate how international civil society and supranational law have
affected both the ways in which the Meuse River is managed and the objectives of the
management. The actors involved include the water governance bodies for the
Netherlands, Flanders, and Wallonia. Flanders and Wallonia are the Flemish- and Frenchspeaking parts of Belgium, and while many concerns are handled by the central
government, water is dealt with separately. I also look at intergovernmental bodies, as
well as multilateral agreements between the riparian nations of the Meuse and how they
interact with EU-level law, such as the Water Framework Directive, to further the
discourse of integrative management and clean water.
The Meuse Rivers runs for 925 km, from northern France, through Belgium, and into
the Netherlands, where it terminates at the North Sea. The river basin includes Germany

and Luxembourg. The Meuse also runs through the heart of Maastricht. In fact, the Dutch
name for the Meuse is the Maas, which will also be used in this essay.
According to Joseph Soeters, this “Euregion” traditionally has not been very well
connected. He claims that due to the process of nationalization that occurred after the
Second World War, the five provinces across the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium in
the Maas-Rhine Euregion began to look inward to their own countries, rather than to each
other for cooperation about the watercourse that they shared.lviii However, toward the end
of the century, increased institutional interaction between the regions led to a discourse of
integrated management and cooperation as influenced by EU-level institutional
interactions. The international environmental movement of the 1970s and „80s also began
to see itself reflected in governmental action, as the right to clean water could be enforced
because of the strength of EU-level environmental law.
The Netherlands is at the end of the Meuse River, and therefore is “by its location
vulnerable to transboundary water pollution.”lix Jan van Dunne wrote in 1999 about the
challenges to control transboundary pollution in the Meuse River. Both point and nonpoint source pollution---that is to say, pollution from a specific incident or site and
pollution that accumulates from many different sources---were addressed using tort law.
Van Dunne recognizes the limitations of this approach, citing that in “most
environmental liability cases the causal relationship between discharge and pollution is
complicated from a technical point of view, and, as a consequence, also from a legal
point of view.”lx Needless to say, the individual case tort approach was usually
ineffective, as it normally allowed polluters in upstream areas to get away with pollution
that affected downstream nations. This approach reflects the way in which water was
managed in the EU before the discourses of integrative water management came with the
rise of supranational governance and the inherent value of water was recognized with the
international environmental movement. These two aspects of globalization have altered
the way in which nations can interact to address transboundary watercourses as well as
the aims of management.
The Water Framework Directive represents a large step for transboundary water
management in the Meuse River basin. The discourse of integrated and cooperative
management contained in the WFD has been a driver in the cooperation of the
governments of the Netherlands, Flanders, and Wallonia. Flanders and Limburg, the
province of the Netherlands where the Maas enters the country, share 50 km of the river
where it runs along the border.lxi Aldo Janssen, a Water Manager at the Rijkswaterstaat in
Limburg, expressed that EU-level law has not only opened up space for intergovernmental cooperation, but has also made that cooperation easier and more effective.
It has given Limburg and Flanders grounds to enforce better environmental and pollution
control practices in Wallonia.lxii Prior to the implementation of the WFD, there was
almost nothing that Limburg and Flanders could do to stem the flow of pollution coming
from Wallonia. Until recently, sewage in cities along the Meuse in Wallonia, such as
Liege, was dumped directly into the river without filtration of any kind.lxiii This practice
was harmful to human health as well as the health of the river. However, with the
implementation and enforcement of the WFD by the EU, Wallonia is now held
accountable for pollution.
The WFD influenced not only the accountability of nations for their pollution, but also
the institutional framework under which the Meuse is managed. A Meuse Treaty was

signed in 1998 between Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands,
which was then supplanted by the Ghent Treaty in order to reflect the principles of the
WFD. The Ghent Treaty included the establishment of the International Meuse
Commission (ICM) in 2002.lxiv The ICM is based in Liege and conducts strategic
meetings to coordinate the obligations of the WFD, devise plans for improved flood and
risk management from climate change, and provide advice for combating water pollution.
According to Janssen, the ICM has so far not lived up to its potential due to a lack of will
and funds on the part of the Walloon and French governments. Flooding and water
quality do not seem to be concerns for the Walloon government. However, Janssen sees
some improvement recently, especially with pollution control, and is optimistic about the
future of cooperation. 2009 was declared the year of international water cooperation
within the Rijkswaterstaat, a clear sign of optimism concerning the adoption of the
integrated management discourse of the EU.lxv
The management of the Meuse has been influenced not only by EU-level policy and
discourse, but by the international environmental movement as well. Aldo Janssen
mentioned the influence that international NGOs, such as GreenPeace, have had on
government policy. There is a time lag between public opinion and government policy,
and the effects of the activism of the 1980s is now being felt at the policy level.lxvi An
example of this influence is the aims of the Maaswerken project, an initiative of the
Dutch and Flemish governments to restore the riparian environment along the Meuse.
The result of this project will be a continuous conservation area of around 1,250
hectares.lxvii The idea behind the project is to return the Maas to its natural state, before
humans deepened the river and altered the riparian environment. This project has clearly
been influenced by the discourse of the inherent value of nature, and is an interesting
example of the intersection between integrative cooperative management and
environmental discourse.
IV. Conclusion
Jos C.N. Raadschelders proposes that, “To understand the contemporary and future
challenge of water management truly requires an inter-disciplinary perspective.”lxviii This
statement reflects the complex connectivity that globalization has brought to the world of
transboundary water management. This essay has illustrated how economic globalization,
the rise of supranational institutions, and global civil society have all influenced
discourses on water and therefore the management of transboundary watercourses. The
main lesson to be learned from this exercise and the case studies is that these aspects of
globalization are inextricably intertwined and interrelated. The future of transboundary
watercourse management will become more important as the demand for water increases
and the climate changes. The field of political ecology will become an important lens
through which to explore environmental issues as the significance and interdisciplinary
nature thereof become more evident with the passage of time and the intensification of
the drivers of globalization.
The two case studies illustrate the need for a multidimensional approach to the study of
influences in water discourses. The LHWP case study shows how neo-liberal,
sustainability, and human rights discourses can interact and complement one another. The
Meuse River case study is an example of the interactions between global civil society and

regional governance bodies. In order to decipher the influences of water management and
therefore plan for future management, it is necessary to echo Raadschelder‟s statement
that water management requires an interdisciplinary approach. These case studies tell us
that globalization is not just one force, but many forces acting from different directions.
Globalization has been interpreted in this article as three forces that act upon
transboundary watercourses; three forces that are inseparable from each other and yet
unique. The fact that globalization entails many different channels serves to reinforce
Raadschelder‟s argument in favor of interdisciplinary efforts. No single discipline can
unlock the complex workings of globalization. Therefore, it is necessary to reach across
disciplinary lines in order to effectively investigate the phenomena unfolding around us.
The effects of globalization must be put in comparative perspective, for only then can we
decipher the political ecology of water.
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